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Abstract
This paper examines the impact on inequality and poverty of the economic
crisis in four European countries, namely France, Germany, the UK and Ireland.
The period examined, 2008 to 2010, was one of great economic turmoil, yet it
is unclear whether changes in inequality and poverty rates over this time period
were mainly driven by market driven e¤ects or by tax-benet policy reforms. We
disentangle these e¤ects by producing counterfactual ("no reform") scenarios using
tax-benet microsimulation and representative household surveys of each country.
For the period under study, we nd that the policy reaction has contributed to
stabilizing or even decreasing inequality and relative poverty in the UK, France
and especially in Ireland, a country where rapidly rising unemployment would have
otherwise increased poverty. Market income inequality has nonetheless pushed up
inequality and relative poverty in France. Relative poverty and, notably, child
poverty, have increased in Germany as a consequence of policy responses combined
with the increasing inequality of market income.
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1 Introduction
The current economic slowdown calls for a careful investigation of how to make tax-benet
systems more cost e¤ective and how to minimize welfare losses and limit the extension of
deep poverty at a time of cuts in public spending. For this purpose, lessons from the very
recent period, and, notably, the role of policy developments occurring during 2008-2010,
the rst "dip" in the Great Recession, can be learned. As yet, little is known about
the capacity of existing redistribution systems to soften the negative impacts of job and
earnings losses,1 as well as the e¤ectiveness of the policy initiatives that quickly followed
the onset of the economic slump. This is not only due to the fact that microdata come
with an inevitable delay but also because the di¤erent factors a¤ecting the distribution of
disposable income are intertwined.2 In particular, it is important to attempt to disentangle
the e¤ect of changes in market income inequality (due to wage cuts, job losses or working
time reduction in the private sector, changes to the minimum wage etc.) and the e¤ect
of tax-benet reforms. The latter may indeed have cushioned or exacerbated the e¤ects
of the crisis on the income distribution through income tax and social insurance reforms,
changes in the generosity of family benets or welfare programs, etc. Comparing European
experiences in this context also seems highly relevant. The e¤ects of each of these factors
may have been di¤erent across countries depending on how deeply they were a¤ected by
the crisis and on the specic nature of the policy responses.
In this paper, we provide some answers to these questions by studying the contribution
of tax-benet policies to changes in inequality and poverty in Europe between 2008 and
2010. We use tax-benet microsimulation to construct counterfactual situations that
show what the post-tax and transfer income distribution would have looked like in 2010 if
either tax-benet policies or the distribution of pre-tax and transfer incomes had remained
unchanged between the two years. In this way, we are able to disentangle the pure e¤ect
of tax-benet policy changes occurring over the period from changes in the environment
1An exception is the study of Jenkins et al. (2013) on the short-term impact of the Great Recession
in twenty-one OECD countries. The authors nd that the household sector was largely protected from
the downturn through the tax and benet system. Among the six countries that the authors study in
detail, the softest landings were found to be experienced by the countries with the strongest welfare
states, Germany and Sweden. For most of the countries studied, there was little change in the household
income distribution between 2007 and 2009. They note, however, that in the medium- to longer-term,
there is likely to be much greater change as a result of scal consolidation.
2For instance, an approach that consists of measuring the contribution of taxes and transfers to overall
inequality/poverty at di¤erent points in time, e.g. before and after the rst "dip" of the Great Recession,
does not allow us to extract the pure e¤ect of policy changes from their interaction with the underlying
population. That is, this method cannot tell whether social assistance schemes, for example, may appear
more redistributive because of their increased generosity or because of automatic increases in welfare
spending as unemployment rises.
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in which these policies operate, particularly changes in market income inequality which
may have occurred due to job losses or wage cuts.3 This analysis is carried out for four
European countries which were a¤ected di¤erently by the economic crisis, namely France,
Germany, Ireland and the UK. For each country, we isolate and quantify the e¤ect of
tax-benet policy changes over 2008-2010 on a range of poverty and inequality measures.
We use representative microdata for each country (EU-SILC data) from the beginning of
the economic crisis (2007/2008) and from the latest period available (2009/2010), coupled
with microsimulation models (SWITCH for Ireland and EUROMOD for France, Germany
and the UK), i.e. models that transform gross income into disposable income for each
household, taking into account all taxes, transfers and contributions in each period and
country. Using these simulations, we can draw conclusions about the e¤ect of the economic
crisis on poverty and inequality across countries as well as the e¤ectiveness of tax-benet
policies in each country in responding to the economic crisis.
We nd that, while the policy response wasvery similar in the UK and France, it has
contributed to stabilize relative poverty only in the UK. Market income changes have
pushed up inequality, child poverty and, especially, overall poverty depth more strongly
in France so that policy responses have only partly corrected this trend, resulting in an
increase in the intensity of poverty and in child poverty. Ireland, in the early part of the
crisis, implemented an even more progressive policy response than the UK and France,
due mainly to sharp increases in income-related taxation with more limited reductions
in welfare payments. This policy e¤ect is responsible for an overall reduction in relative
poverty and inequality in this country. The UK, France and Ireland have managed to
reduce absolute child poverty (i.e. poverty calculated with the poverty line anchored in
real terms at its initial level). In contrast, policy responses have been fairly regressive in
Germany, with tax cuts and very slow uprating of social transfers resulting in an increase in
relative poverty, poverty depth and elderly poverty. Other e¤ects, which include changes
in market incomes and non-simulated policies like changes in unemployment insurance in
France, have played a relatively modest role despite rising unemployment in Ireland (and
to a lesser extent in France and the UK) and work sharing in Germany. Among exceptions
are the large contributions of these other e¤ects to the increased poverty rate and depth
in France and to child poverty in Germany. Overall, tax-benet policy responses have
3This approach is applied in the study of Clark and Leicester (2004) who carefully investigate the
distributional e¤ect of policy changes over the 1980s and 1990s in the UK. It is then embedded in a
more formal decomposition framework in Bargain and Callan (2010) for France and Ireland and Bargain
(2012) for the UK for the period 1999-2001. A related concept for the comparison of tax regimes with
respect to progressivity, the transplant-and-compare procedure (Dardanoni and Lambert 2002), is applied
by Lambert and Thoresen (2009) for Norway. They isolate the tax policy e¤ect by comparing pre-tax
income distributions which have been adjusted to a common base.
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played an important role, sometimes explaining most of the time changes in poverty.
Further research should make use of more recent years of data and uprated tax-benet
microsimulations in order to identify the impact of policy factors and shifts in market
income over the prolonged crisis.
The paper is laid out in the following manner. Section 2 examines the macroeconomic
situation faced by the four countries under examination as well detailing the policy changes
implemented over the time period analysed. Section 3 documents the methodology and
data used. Section 4 presents the results of our analysis while section 5 concludes.
2 Macroeconomic and Policy Background
2.1 Welfare Regimes before the Crisis and the Macroeconomic
Context
Our study presents an original perspective by comparing trends in income distributions
and policy developments in four European countries which have been impacted di¤er-
ently by the crisis. In the year preceding it, all four countries were relatively close in
terms of GDP per capita.4 France and Germany used to be classied under the conser-
vative/corporatist welfare regime (Esping-Andersen 1990) while the UK represented a
more liberal model, although some nuance is required. Despite low income tax rates, the
UK o¤ered a safety net in the form of income support schemes and a relatively generous
family tax credit for working poor families. In parallel, France and Germany have expe-
rienced a signicant cut in tax levels since the early 2000s while introducing or increasing
transfers to the working poor. In Germany, wage moderation and reforms of the social
system in the early 2000s may also have had some regressive impact on the distribution of
income but there is no substantial evidence of this. Ireland was traditionally placed at a
somewhat intermediary position, with a social protection system described sometimes as
"catholic corporatist" (McLaughlin, 1993), due to the role of the Church and the central
role of the family, or as competitive corporatist since transfers, taxation and labor market
institutions were broadly adapted to competitiveness objectives (Hardiman 2000).
The evolution observed during the rst dip of the crisis is particularly contrasted, ranging
from the German employment "miracle" (still accompanied by wage moderation) to a
strong negative adjustment in the Irish economy, with the UK and France performing
4In 2007, France, Germany and the UK were 8%, 16% and 17% above the EU-27 average GDP per
capita respectively while Ireland was 46% above the average (and the richest country after Luxembourg).
Repatriation of multinational prots from Ireland, however, means that GNP was about 80% of the level
of GDP, providing a better measure of the national income available to Irish residents more comparable
to that of our three other countries.
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somewhere in between. Given these di¤erent experiences, we may expect very di¤erent
trends in market incomes between 2008 and 2010 across these countries. We describe
the macroeconomic context in detail below. The importance of automatic stabilizers and
discretionary scal policy in each country will also, ultimately, determine the extent to
which the Great Recession a¤ected overall poverty and inequality measures during this
timespan. Policy options in each country are described in the next sub-section.
Germany and France. Germany experienced a strong macro shock in 2008-09 ( 4:9%
in real GDP) but a return to positive growth of over 4% in 2010 as shown in Figure 1,
largely due to strong global demand for German exports (Jenkins et al, 2013). The use
of short-time work in particular has prevented an increase in unemployment and, accord-
ing to Bargain et al. (2012), has partly (fully) limited the increase in relative (absolute)
poverty. Unemployment rates in Germany and France prior to 2008 were generally higher
than those in Ireland and the UK, as shown in Figure 2. German unemployment rates
resumed falling after 2009, reaching their lowest level in recent decades (5:5% in 2012).5
France was less internationally exposed than other countries like Germany due to a tra-
ditionally strong reliance on its internal market. The macro shock was therefore slightly
smaller ( 3:7% of GDP in 2009) but so was the return to growth in 2010 (+1:1%). This
was accompanied by a long-lasting deterioration of labor market conditions (Figure 2),
showing an increase in unemployment from a low of 7:8% in 2008 to 9:7% in 2010.
Ireland and the UK. The period 2008 to 2010 saw a recession of unprecedented
severity in the Irish economy. GDP had grown strongly over the preceding 15 years, with
employment almost doubling and unemployment rates falling sharply (Figure 2). During
this Celtic Tigerperiod, unemployment fell to just over 4% in 2000 and remained around
this level until 2008. Over the years 2008 to 2010, real national income fell by close to 10%
more than double the size of the fall in the UK, Germany and France. The economic
deterioration was driven by a collapse in the property sector and an accompanying sharp
fall in employment in the construction sector, upon which the Irish economy had become
heavily reliant, a banking crisis and the worldwide nancial crisis.6 Unemployment more
5Burda and Hunt (2011) attribute this unemployment miracleto a variety of factors such as employers
reticence to hire in the preceding expansion, wage moderation and an increased adoption of working time
accounts. Brenke et al. (2011) also give credit to the expansion of the short-term compensation scheme,
which provides nancial aid for rms experiencing di¢ culties if they agree to reduce working hours and
pay, describing it as the German answerto the great recession.
6The banking crisis resulted in the government guaranteeing both investors and bondholders and
led to unsustainable yields on Irish bonds as government debt grew. These unsustainable yields led to
the Irish government seeking a nancial bailoutfrom the ECB and IMF in 2010. Firm commitments
to scal austerity formed part of the terms of the economic adjustment package, with further negative
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than doubled between 2008 and 2010, increasing from 6:4% in 2008 to 13:9% in 2010.
The UK, fuelled by the global nancial crisis, also entered its deepest recession since the
Second World War in 2008. Signicant falls in real GDP were experienced between 2008
and 2010 with a decline of 1:6% in 2008 and 4:6% in 2009, followed by a return to positive
growth in 2010 of 1%. A weak recovery was followed by the rst double-dip recession in
the UK since the 1970s as a return to negative growth occurred in 2012. Unemployment
rose from 5:6% in 2008 to 7:8% in 2010.
Figure 1: GDP per capita Growth Rate, 1996-2012
Source:Eurostat
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2.2 Policy Reactions to the Great Recession
Our decomposition analysis aims at isolating "policy e¤ect" from "other e¤ects". By
"policy e¤ect", we mean the e¤ect of changes in tax-benet policies related to direct
taxation, social security contributions, non-contributory benets (child and family benets
as well as social assistance) and, for the UK and Ireland, the contributory benets which
are treated as redistribution (essentially Jobseekers allowances and public pensions). The
set of tax-benet policies which are actually simulated in our analysis and which constitute
the scope of our "policy e¤ect" is presented in Table A.1 in the Appendix. By "other
e¤ects", we mean all the other factors that can a¤ect the distribution of disposable income:
these are primarily changes in gross incomes due to market forces but they also account
for other policies (changes in the minimum wage, changes in unemployment benet or
pension rules in France and Germany, etc.). We shall dene these e¤ects in more detail
in the methodological section and quantify them using our decomposition method. For
consequences for household disposable incomes (see Doorley et al (2013).
5
Figure 2: Unemployment Rates, 2005-2012
Source:Eurostat
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now, we describe the main policy changes characterizing the period studied, 2008-2010.7
Tax-benet policy changes in all four countries are also summarized in Table A.2 in the
Appendix.
France. A number of scal and social policy reforms were enacted in France during the
great recession. The most important structural changes to the welfare system concerns
the minimum income. In 2009, the minimum guaranteed income benet (RMI) and the
lone parent means-tested benet (API) were replaced with a single means-tested benet
(RSA, Revenu de Solidarité Active) which incorporates an in-work benet component.
That is, the RSA ensures a minimum income per month, with larger amounts for eligible
lone parents, while providing permanent incentives to work due to the taper rate of 38%
on earnings, replacing the 100% rate under API and RMI. While the RSA was in operation
for only a few months in 2009, our simulation of the 2010 situation should account for
the full year e¤ect of this reform compared to the 2008 system. The extension of social
assistance to the working poor thanks to the lower withdrawal rate  and despite the
low take-up of the "in-work" RSA (33%) must contribute to decreasing poverty. There
is also a progressive e¤ect of welfare payment uprating policies. Over the three years
studied, family benets and social assistance payments have been uprated at around 3%,
which is slightly faster than mean wage growth (+1:9%) and mean income growth (our
7For more information on policy reforms during the period under study, see Doorley (2013) for France,
Ochmann and Fossen (2013) for Germany, Doorley et al. (2013) and Callan et al (2012) for Ireland and
Sutherland (2013) for the UK.
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 uprating factor, equal to 0:4% for France). However, the earned income tax credit on
low-wage earners (PPE) was frozen in nominal terms.8 On the side of income taxation and
social contributions, a salient policy measure of the Sarkozy government, the tax rebate
on paid overtime, should not impact on our results since it was put in place in August
2007 and withdrawn in 2012, outside the period studied. Slightly progressive tax reforms
have taken place in 2009 (the withholding tax on capital was increased from 16 to 18%,
and the lowest earners were given relief on two-thirds of their tax bill, an "income tax
holiday") and 2010 (the marginal income tax rate for the highest earners increased from
40% to 41% while the RSA was nanced with a further 1:1% tax on capital income).9
Germany. The period is characterized by very modest adjustments to social benets.
The basic amount of social assistance (ALGII) was uprated by just 1% between 2008-
2010 while payments for rent and heating were frozen. More structural changes in family
benets are also observed in Germany. While the universal child benet (Kindergeld)
was higher for each child after the third in 2008, rates increased from the second child
onwards in 2009.10 That same year, education benets were reformed. Students with
children under 10 years of age are now entitled to a more generous top-up of e113 for
the rst child and e198 for any subsequent children. Means-tested child allowances have
also been reformed.11 Reforms on the tax side also seem of a regressive nature. Taxation
of capital income (Kapitaleinkommensteuer) was modied in 2009. Until then, capital
income was treated like any other income, except for a separate tax free allowance. From
2009 onwards, capital income was taxed separately at a at rate of 25%, except for a tax-
free allowance, which was slightly increased (+6% in 2009). That same year, the lowest
8Also, an exceptional bonus of e150 (Prime Exceptionnelle) for families eligible for the "Back to
School" means-tested child benet and of e200 (Prime de solidarité active) for low income families were
part of a specic anti-crisis package which was not renewed in 2010 (and therefore not relevant for our
analysis).
9Among other policy developments that may be captured in our "other e¤ects", let us emphasize
reforms of the unemployment insurance system. While unemployment benet duration used to be related
to the number of months that the individual had worked for in the previous three years, the 2009 reform
switched unemployment insurance to a "one day worked, one day of compensation" system, provided the
individual had worked at least 4 months in the last 28.
10In addition, in 2009, there was an add-on to the general benet rate, of e100 per child, which was
subsequently abolished in 2010 so that it should not a¤ect our decomposition exercise over 2008-2010.
11A child allowance, of a maximum of e140 per month per entitled child, was paid if household income
was deemed not to cover the needs of children younger than 25 who live in the same household. From
2009 on, parental leave benets are included in the income test. The income threshold used to dene the
childrensneeds is set at a xed amount of e600 per lone parent and e900 per couple. The fraction of
own income that is withdrawn from the benet amount decreases in 2009 from 70% to 50%.
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income tax rate decreased from 15 to 14%.12
Ireland. Over the 2008 to 2010 period, austerity measures were focused mainly on tax
increases, with substantial increases in income-related taxes. These led to a strongly
progressive impact over this period. Recall that the Irish government had become over-
reliant on transitory taxes (such as stamp duty on property transactions) and, during the
boom, had narrowed the tax base, removing many workers from the tax net entirely. In
2009, an Income Levy was introduced, payable on gross income (excluding social welfare
payments). The initial rate was 1% on annual income up toe100; 100 and 2% on income in
excess of that. In a supplementarybudget of 2009, necessitated by the rapid deterioration
in the public nances, the income levy rates increased with an exemption for the rst
e15; 028 of annual income (with a higher exemption limit, e20; 000, for the over 65s),
a rate of 2% charged on income from e75; 036 to e174; 980 and a rate of 6% charged in
excess of that level. In addition, the cap on the annual income above which no further
social insurance contributions (PRSI) were payable rose in 2009 while the Health Levy (a
payment made to fund health services) was doubled (reaching 4%, and even 5% for incomes
above e75; 036) in 2010. On the welfare side, the overall reduction in working age benets
for 2008-2010 was just under 1%.13 Rates paid to old age pensioners remained at the
increased level. Universal child benet was sharply reduced, falling by 10% between 2008
and 2010 with a full o¤setting of the impact on welfare recipients through an increase in a
more targeted form of child income support. Non-contributory unemployment payments
(Jobseekers Allowance) for those aged 18-21 were reduced to e100 per week (compared
to e196 for older workers). Public servants experienced two reductions in pay via a
Pension Related Deduction (PRD), introduced in 2009, whereby the rst e15; 000 of
annual earnings were exempt, with 5% paid on the next e5; 000 of earnings, 10% paid
on earnings between e20; 000 and e60; 000 and 10:5% on earnings above e60; 000. This
a¤ected net pay. A further pay-cut for public sector workers, this time on gross pay, was
implemented in 2010 with a reduction of 5% on the rst e30; 000 of salary, 7:5% on the
next e40; 000 and a 10% reduction on the next e55; 000. These changes to public sector
wages are treated here as an extra taxon the public sector and, hence, are modelled
explicitly and will fall into our policy e¤ect.
12The "other e¤ects" component of our decomposition may reect reforms of unemployment insurance
in Germany. The period is notably characterized by the introduction of more exible arrangements for
unemployment benets and policy reforms targeted at the older segment of the labour force, corresponding
to a shift in the generosity of unemployment benet duration from those under 55 to those over 55.
13The 2009 budget saw increases of 3%, before the full scale of the public nance crisis was realised.
Budget 2010 reduced the payment rates of the social welfare schemes applicable to those of working age
by 4%.
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UK. Most social welfare payments increased annually in real terms over the years 2008-
2010 using the retail price index (RPI) or by the Rossi price index in the case of means-
tested benets. Since the Rossi index excludes housing costs and local taxes, welfare
payments have increased faster than overall prices and even faster than wages (Income
Support has increased by 8:2% while the mean wage has increased by 1:7%). Universal
child benets have also increased rapidly (+8%). While the basic element of the Child
Tax Credit was not uprated, the child increment was increased by 7:2%. Redistribution
towards the working poor was also accentuated, with an uprating of 6:7% of the working
tax credit. The basic rate limit of income taxation increased in 2009 to £ 37; 400 and
remained constant in 2010 while a third rate of income tax was introduced that year
(50% on incomes over £ 150; 000). The personal tax allowance was increased by £ 130
for the tax years 2009-10 and removed for incomes above £ 100; 000 in April 2010. With
regards to social insurance rates and bands, the upper earnings limit increased in April
2009 to align it with the threshold of the top income tax rate. The standard rate reduced
from 17:5% to 15% in December 2009.
3 Methodology
We use tax-benet microsimulators linked to household surveys to simulate disposable
income distributions and, subsequently, inequality and poverty indices for one year at
the onset of the crisis (2008), for a more recent year based on the availability of the
microsimulation models (2010) and for counterfactual scenarios as described hereafter.
3.1 Microsimulation and Data
Simulations are performed using the tax-benet calculator EUROMOD for France, Ger-
many and the UK and SWITCH for Ireland. Both of these microsimulation models
numerically simulate tax-benet rules, allowing the computation of all social contribu-
tions, direct taxes and transfers to yield household disposable income. Microsimulators
are linked to the Family Resources Survey (FRS) for years 2008/09 and 2009/10 for the
UK (collected over the twelve months between April and March), to the EU-SILC data for
years 2008 (2007 incomes) and 2010 (2009 incomes) for France and Germany (EU-SILC
data is collected over the calendar year), and to EU-SILC data from 2008 (2008 incomes)
and 2010 (2010 incomes) for Ireland.14 The income reference period for the German and
14The FRS is a well-known source for statistical studies in the UK, notably used in national microsim-
ulation (see Sutherland, 2013). EU-SILC (statistics on income and life conditions) constitute the most
recent and important source of microdata for comparative studies on income distribution in Europe.
Started in 2003 for 6 member states (Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Luxemburg and Austria), as
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French EU-SILC data is the previous year so that the 2008 data collects 2007 income and
the 2010 data collects 2009 income. We account for this delay by uprating all income
sources by specic factors in EUROMOD in order to be able to use the 2008 and 2010
policy parameters with the corresponding data for each year. In the Appendix, we com-
pare simulated disposable income distributions with actual distributions (i.e. those from
external statistics or directly observed in the data) and discuss the potential discrepancies
caused by delayed incomes for these two countries. Finally, notice that EU-SILC data
used in SWITCH for Ireland and FRS data used in EUROMOD for the UK make use
of current income, i.e. household income in its labor market status at the date of data
collection, rather than annual income. Annual income is used for the two others countries
but also in external statistics. In the Appendix, we extensively discuss how this other
source of di¤erences between observed and simulated distributions may be related to such
di¤erences in terms of income denition.
3.2 Aggregate Changes in Incomes, Taxes and Benets
Table 1 shows mean household gross income, taxes, transfers, social security contributions
(SSC) and disposable income for the four countries investigated. These statistics give
some preliminary insight into potential tax-benet policy e¤ects on household disposable
income. Gross income decreases in all countries between 2008 and 2010, except for the
UK which saw modest income rises. In France and Germany, however, disposable income
increases while in Ireland, it decreases less rapidly than gross income. In the UK, there
is a more rapid increase of disposable than of gross income. The main reason for these
phenomena is the stabilizing e¤ect of tax-benet systems over the 2008-2010 period, i.e.
a decrease in market income for some households is partly compensated by an automatic
decrease (increase) in taxes paid (benets received). On top of this stabilization provided
by the initial policy set, there may be also the specic e¤ect of policy changes over
the period, the role of which is investigated in the rest of this paper. We can already
comment on this using trends in tax and benet aggregates in Table 1. Yet we must keep
in mind that these trends combine the stabilization e¤ect (how taxes paid and benets
received vary due to changes in market incomes) and the e¤ect of policy reforms during the
period. Tax changes in Germany and France seem regressive. In particular, in Germany,
the tax bill falls substantially between the two periods ( 11%), likely due to the change
in taxation of capital income previously described. Conversely, tax payments increase
well as Norway, EU-SILC has been extended to other EU countries in 2004-2005, followed by Bulgaria,
Rumania, Turkey and Swizerland from 2007. It gathers annual cross-sectional information on European
individuals and households (incomes, socio-demographics, social exclusion, life condition). It was origi-
nally created to provide the material for structural indices of social cohesion in Europe (Laeken indices).
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in Ireland, following the exceptional measures described above and, in particular, the
introduction of a Tax Levy on all gross incomes. Social security contributions increase a
lot but mean changes hide the progressive structure of the Health Levy. The tax increase
in the UK is small and in line with the gross income increase. In France (and the UK),
the transfer system contributes most to the increase in disposable income with households
receiving an average of 9% (11%) more in transfers in 2010 compared to 2008, probably
inuenced by the uprating of social transfers and tax credits and the introduction of an
in-work transfer, the RSA, in France as described above. A similar and even stronger
redistributive e¤ect can be observed for Ireland, with a 24% increase in transfers between
2008 and 2010 more than compensating for the sharp rise in employee contributions
and cushioning much of the dramatic decrease in mean gross income. Policy changes
on the benet side are more modest in Germany, with transfer payments increasing by
only 1% over the period. Again, these trends combine the interaction of existing policies
with changes in market income, together with genuine tax-benet policy reforms over the
period. The decomposition approach suggested hereafter allows us to disentangle these
two factors.
Table 1: Mean Household Income, Taxes and Transfers
2008 2010 % Δ 2008 2010 % Δ 2008 2010 % Δ 2008 2010 % Δ
Gross income 2,905 2,865 -1.4% 2,693 2,684 -0.4% 3,383 3,008 -11.1% 2,156 2,177 1.0%
Taxes 523 493 -6% 589 525 -11% 466 499 7% 461 472 2%
Transfers 1,113 1,217 9% 986 993 1% 1,017 1,263 24% 527 587 11%
Employees' contrib. 296 251 -15% 396 409 3% 93 149 59% 152 155 2%
Self-employed contr. 50 48 -4% 37 32 -13% 21 29 38% 11 10 -2%
Disposable income 3,149 3,289 4.4% 2,585 2,638 2.1% 3,817 3,631 -4.9% 2,059 2,126 3.3%
No. of  households 10,418 11,042 13,312 13,079 5,247 4,642 25,088 25,200
Monetary values for Ireland, France and Germany are in current Euros. Monetary values for the UK are in current pounds sterling. German and French results from 2008 and 2010 Euromod systems used with
2008 and 2010 EU-SILC data. UK results from Euromod 2008 and 2010 systems using 2008/9 and 2009/10 FRS data. Irish results from SWITCH 2008 and 2010 using 2008 and 2010 EU-
SILC data
IrelandGermany UKFrance
3.3 Denitions and the Decomposition Method
First, it is important to dene our terminology and the scope of the policy changes
that we intend to characterize in what follows. Our analysis focuses on changes in the
distribution of household disposable income (after equivalization to account for household
size and composition, using the modied OECD equivalent scale). Disposable income,
as widely used to measure poverty and inequality, is dened as all household incomes net
of taxes and social contributions and after receipt of all types of benets. By household
gross incomeor market income, we mean the total amount of labor income (including
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replacement incomes, i.e., public pensions and unemployment benets, in France and
Germany), capital income and private pensions before taxes and benets. The only
di¤erence of treatment between countries concerns the nature of replacement incomes
(public pensions and unemployment benets). They are considered as transfers in the
UK and Ireland because public pensions and unemployment insurance can be viewed as
part of the redistributive system (maximum benet levels are not tied to the amount of
past contributions). For France and Germany, pensions and unemployment benets are
insurance mechanisms, with payments closely related to contributions levels (even if the
latter are capped above a certain income level), so that we treat them as replacement
income among other sources of gross income.
Our decomposition analysis will isolate a "policy e¤ect" from "other e¤ects", as sketched
above. The "policy e¤ect" denotes the contribution of changes in tax-benet policies
related to direct taxation (including tax allowances and tax credits), social security con-
tributions, non-contributory benets (child and family benets as well as social assistance)
and, for the UK and Ireland, the contributory benets treated as redistribution (essen-
tially Jobseekers allowances and public pensions).15 "Other e¤ects" correspond to all
other factors inuencing the disposable income distribution, i.e. changes in gross incomes
due to market forces but also non-simulated policies (changes in minimum wage, changes
in unemployment benet in France and Germany etc.).16
We dene four main simulated distributions of disposable income in our analysis. The
rst two are simply the base and end period disposable income distributions, which we
denote (0) and (4) respectively, obtained by applying the tax-benet rules of base and
end period to the corresponding household gross incomes. These income distributions are
simulated so Gini indices or poverty rates calculated on the basis of these distributions
may not coincide precisely with o¢ cial data or with Gini and poverty rates calculated
from observed disposable incomes at base and end periods. In Appendix 3, we explain
in detail how and why simulated inequality and poverty measures di¤er in levels from
observed ones at any point in time. We show nonetheless that they are relatively close in
terms of time variation, which is the key aspect for the validity of our analysis (see Figure
A.1 in the Appendix).
The value added of our approach comes precisely from the ability to simulate actual as
well as possible income distributions and, essentially, counterfactual distributions. We
15Simulated policies, dening the scope of our policy e¤ect, are listed in Table A.1 in the Appendix
while the actual changes in these policies over the period were described in section 2 and summarized in
Table A.2 in the Appendix.
16For Ireland, changes to public sector wages are also counted in our policy e¤ect, as discussed above.
Failure to model the pension related deduction a¤ecting public sector pay would mean that the e¤ect of
this would not be picked up in the other e¤ectas it a¤ected net and not gross pay.
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dene scenario (2) as the end year distribution under the assumption that tax-benet
policies have not changed between the two years. Symmetrically, we characterize scenario
(3) as the end year distribution assuming no change in all other factors, including the
distribution of market incomes (i.e. assuming that the only change over the period is
due to tax-benet policy reforms). We introduce some notation to describe the construc-
tion of these counterfactuals. Denote y a matrix describing the population contained in
the data, i.e., each row contains all the information about a given household, including
various gross/market income sources and socio-demographic characteristics. Denote d
the tax-benet functiontransforming, for each household, gross incomes and household
characteristics into a certain level of disposable income. Tax-benet calculations also
depend on a set of monetary parameters p (e.g., maximum benet amounts, threshold
level of tax brackets, etc.). Thus, the distribution of disposable income is represented
hereafter by di(pj; yl), for a hypothetical scenario including the population of year l, the
tax-benet parameters of year j and the tax-benet structure of year i. We are inter-
ested in relative inequality/poverty indices I, computed as a function I

di(p
j; yl)

of the
(simulated) distribution of disposable income. Denoting base and end years by 0 and 1
respectively, we rst simulate the base and end year situations (0) and (4) as described
above, corresponding to d0(p0; y0) and d1(p1; y1) respectively.
To construct our key counterfactual scenarios (2) and (3), we must consider the possibility
of nominally adjusting income levels by the uprating factor 1, i.e., the income growth
rate between year 0 and year 1. That is, 1y0 retains the structural characteristics of
year 0 data (in particular, the distribution of gross income) but adopts the nominal
levels prevailing in year 1. Policy changes can combine changes in policy structure d
and changes in parameters p (the policy uprating). We dene counterfactuals where
tax-benet monetary parameters can be uprated using the same factor 1 that is used to
scale up the distribution of gross income between period 0 and 1. Clearly, the nominally
adjusted system, denoted 1p0, is not identical to the actual set of parameters p1 as
decided by the authorities.17 Thus, scenario (2) is written d0(1p0; y1), i.e. it is the no-
reform counterfactual where the only policy change between years 0 and 1 is an uprating
of money parameters in line with income growth, as explained above. It can be used in a
rst decomposition:
 =

I

d1(p
1; y1)
  I d0(1p0; y1)	 (policy e¤ect) (I)
+

I

d0(
1p0; y1)
  I d0(1p0; 1y0)	 (other e¤ects)
+

I

d0(
1p0; 1y0))
  I d0(p0; y0)	 (income growth).
17Bargain and Callan (2010) show that gross income ination is a distributionally neutral factor that
seems most appropriate for this decomposition exercise. The choice of the uprating factor is also discussed
in length in Bargain (2012).
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where the policy e¤ect is evaluated while holding the population constant at end year.
Scenario (3) is written d1(p1; 1y0) and corresponds to the counterfactual where the market
income distribution is hold constant (market incomes and policy parameters are just
uprated using the same 1 factor). It is used in a second decomposition:
 =

I

d1(p
1; y1)
  I d1(p1; 1y0)	 (other e¤ects) (II)
+

I

d1(p
1; 1y0)
  I d0(1p0; 1y0)	 (policy e¤ect)
+

I

d0(
1p0; 1y0))
  I d0(p0; y0)	 (income growth).
where the policy e¤ect is evaluated while holding the population constant at the base
year.
In both decompositions, the last term is identical. It depends on another counterfactual
scenario d0(1p0; 1y0), denoted situation (1) hereafter. Notice that tax-benet functions
d(p; y) are usually linearly homogeneous in p and y, i.e. a simultaneous change in nominal
levels (e.g. switching from French Franc to Euro) of both gross incomes and monetary tax-
benet parameters should not a¤ect the relative position of households in the distribution
of disposable income. The direct consequence of this is that scenario (0), i.e. d0(p0; y0),
should be equal to scenario (1). That is, the income growth component, the third
term in both decompositions, should be zero. While this should be the case in France,
Ireland and the UK, part of the German system may not fulll this condition. Germany is
characterized by a concave income tax function, in contrast to the piecewise linear income
tax schedule of other countries and, therefore, a non-homogenous tax-benet function. We
shall check this empirically in the next section.
Finally, since there is no compelling reason for preferring the rst decomposition over the
second, we also compute the Shorrocks-Shapley decomposition by averaging the contri-
butions for the two decompositions above, which gives the average policy e¤ect, P , and
the average other e¤ect, O:
P = 1=2  [I[d1(p1; y1)]  I[d0(1p0; y1)]] + 1=2  [I[d1(p1; 1y0)]  I[d0(p0; y0)]]
O = 1=2  [I[d0(1p0; y1)]  I[d0(p0; y0)]] + 1=2  [I[d1(p1; y1)]  I[d1(p1; 1y0)]]:
4 Results
The main results are shown in Figures 3 to 5 and we discuss each country separately
below. In each graph, we summarize the main trends, with bars representing base year
indices normalized to 100, end year indices and index levels under the counterfactual "pol-
icy e¤ect" (if only policies had changed, i.e. market income uprated in a distributionally
neutral way) and the counterfactual "other e¤ects" (if policies were unchanged, i.e. only
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uprated in a distributionally neutral way). Tables A.4 to A.6 in Appendix A present the
complete decomposition results for Germany, France, Ireland and the UK respectively. In
these tables, we report poverty and inequality statistics relating to the base period 0 (cor-
responding to year 2008) in column (0) of each table and the end period 1 (corresponding
to year 2010) in column (4). Three counterfactuals are also presented, as discussed above.
Column (1) shows the base period indices where both the data and the policies are up-
rated to the end period. The di¤erence between column (0) and column (1) is a check
of the linear homogeneity property discussed above. We observe that for all inequality
and poverty indices, this component is zero so that homogeneity holds and the third com-
ponent of both decompositions can be ignored.18 Thus we can concentrate on the main
components of the decomposition method. Column (2) shows the poverty/inequality in-
dices for end year data with (uprated) base year policies while column (3) shows indices
for (uprated) base year data with end year policies. The di¤erence between columns (4)
and (0) depicts the total change in each index between 2008 and 2010. This is decomposed
into the (negligible) income growth e¤ect, the tax-benet policy e¤ect and the "other"
e¤ect which encompasses market income changes and all other potential inuences. We
report three decompositions, the end-period weighted decomposition I, the base-period
weighted decomposition II and the Shorrocks-Shapley decomposition, i.e the average of
these two. We observe that all three decompositions lead to similar conclusions, which
reassures us that results are not sensitive to the decomposition path chosen. Therefore,
and for conciseness, we shall base our comments on the Shapley decomposition results.
The battery of indices we study includes the Gini, the Atkinson index and percentile
ratios for inequality. For the risk of poverty (which we simply denote poverty hereafter
for the sake of brevity), we report the headcount ratio (FGT0), the intensity of poverty
(FGT1) and the depth of poverty when applying the principle of transfers among the
poor (FGT2). (Risk of) poverty is relative, i.e. measured as the proportion of households
below a poverty line set at 60% or 50% of the median of equivalized income. We report
overall poverty and poverty for sub-population. Child poverty is measured as the poverty
rate of households with children under 18, according to the Eurostat denition and elderly
poverty is dened as poverty of households headed by adults over 60 years of age. We also
calculate changes in a more absolute measure of poverty by simply anchoring the poverty
lines to their initial (base year) levels.19
18We have calculated bootstrapped standard errors and nd that this di¤erence is not statistically
di¤erent from zero for all countries (even for Germany where non-homogeneity could be expected due to
income taxation, as previously explained).
19The anchored poverty measure consists of xing the the poverty line at 60% of the median income of
the base year distribution and adjusting it nominally for the end year and the di¤erent counterfactuals.
Adjustments are made using 1 to preserve the homogeneity of the absolute poverty measure, which
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4.1 France
We rst see that inequality has increased between 2008 and 2010 in France, with the
Gini index rising by 7:1% (from 26:5 to 28:4) and the Atkinson index increasing by 15:9%
(from 6:1 to 7). These increases are almost entirely due to changes in market income.
A small policy e¤ect working in the opposite direction is obtained with decomposition
II but not with decomposition I. For the poorest, relative positions deteriorate since the
relative poverty headcount has increased by 13:4%, from 10:3% to 11:7%. This is the
result of a strong shock to their market income ("other e¤ects") with just a very small
compensation by policy e¤ects. The most spectacular result is the rise in the intensity
of poverty, captured by the FGT1. It follows the same pattern as headcount poverty,
i.e. the increase of 24:1% is almost entirely due to market income e¤ects, reecting how
increasing unemployment has a¤ected the lower part of the income distribution. Turning
to "absolute" poverty changes, i.e. when xing the poverty line at a constant level in
real (income ination adjusted) terms, we conrm that the standard of living of the poor
has increased thanks mainly to the policy e¤ect. We can conjecture that the positive
policy e¤ect is largely due to the RSA reform and its in-work component that provided
an income top-up to the working poor. Absolute poverty has decreased by 9:9% while
it would have decreased by just 3% without actual policy changes. Child poverty is
observed to increase by 4:8% over the time period studied. This increase is driven by
market income changes although policy e¤ects do compensate for these to some extent.
The increase in child poverty would have been 10:5% in the absence of policy changes
(notably, the introduction of the RSA). Absolute child poverty is reduced by 19:4% since,
in this case, both policy and other e¤ects cumulate so that the living conditions of family
with children improve. Relative elderly poverty is stable over the period.
4.2 Germany
In terms of inequality, there have been some small changes between 2008 and 2010 in
Germany. The Gini index decreased by 1:7%, from 27:5 to 27:1, over this period (the
Atkinson index also decreased from 6:7 to 6:6). This is entirely due to the market income
e¤ect. The percentile ratios in Table A.4 show, however, a slight increase in inequality
at the bottom of the distribution driven by policy changes, i.e. the ratio of the 50th
would not be the case if we used CPI (EUROSTAT denition). In the latter case, the di¤erence between
(1) and (0) would simply reects the people who switch from poor to nonpoor due to a poverty line
adjusted by ination rather than gross income growth (and not a check of the homogeneity property).
In this case, nonetheless, results are similar at least in two ways: the sign of the total change (4)-(1) is
unchanged and the relative contributions of the policy e¤ect versus other e¤ects are also very similar to
our base results (complete tables using CPI instead of 1 are available from the authors).
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Figure 3: Decomposing Inequality/Poverty Change (France, 2008-2010)
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Measures based on the simulated distribution of disposable income using Euromod with 2008 and 2010 EU-SILC data (incomes from 2007 and 2009); these indices are expressed
relatively to initial period values, normalized to 100.
percentile of income to the 10th percentile. A decline in the relative position of those at
the bottom of the distribution is conrmed by the poverty measures. Headcount ratio
poverty, with a relative poverty line set at 60% of the median, increased by 6:6% between
2008 and 2010, from 16:1% to 17:2% of the German population. This is mainly due to
policy changes, with a very small increase also attributable to market income. Like in
France, one of the most pronounced changes is the increase in poverty depth (FGT1 and
FGT2) over the period, attributable to market income changes for half and to tax-benet
reforms for the other half. These trends reect changes in the relative position of the
lowest income groups but not changes in their absolute standard of living. When xing
the poverty line in real terms, we observe a decrease in the headcount ratio due to the
policy e¤ect. Turning to child poverty, we also observe a decrease in their relative position
while, this time, all of it is explained by market income changes. There is a compensating
e¤ect of policy, indicating that the increase in child poverty would be twice as high in the
absence of the policy e¤ect which is likely to be attributable to increases in child benets
and education allowances. When anchoring the poverty line, we see that these policies in
favor of families with children had a large compensatory e¤ect and managed to increase
the absolute standard of living of these families, despite the negative shock to market
income. By contrast, the increase of 4:3% in the headcount ratio for those aged over 60
is entirely due to tax-benet policy changes. These are likely to include the change in
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capital income taxation which should disproportionately a¤ect the retired.20
Figure 4: Decomposing Inequality/Poverty Change (Germany, 2008-2010)
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Measures based on the simulated distribution of disposable income using Euromod with 2008 and 2010 EU-SILC data (incomes from 2007 and 2009); these indices are expressed
relatively to initial period values, normalized to 100.
4.3 Ireland
Changes in market income have led to an increase in both inequality and poverty in Ire-
land. Yet the impact on poverty is relatively modest compared to France and, especially,
compared to what could have been expected in a context of massive job losses. This is
explained in part by the fact that earnings in the worst hit sector (housing and construc-
tion) were relatively high before the crisis. Interestingly, results for the policy e¤ects are
particularly clear cut with respect to the intuitions sketched in the policy descriptions of
section 2.2. Indeed, policy changes have partly tempered the market e¤ect in the case
of inequality and more than compensated for it in the case of relative poverty. More
precisely, the Gini index has slightly increased between 2008 and 2010, from 29:1 to 29:2
(+0:5%) as has the Atkinson index (+2:7%). These indices would have risen by 10:2%
and 20:3% respectively, had actual tax-benet policy reforms not taken place, i.e. policy
changes have neutralized around 95% of the inequality increase due to the e¤ect of the
crisis on the income distribution (see also ODonoghue et al., 2013). In line with the small
change in the Gini, there was little change in the percentile ratios. Regarding poverty, our
20The "other e¤ects" includes unemployment insurance reforms which can explain some of the increase
in absolute standard of living of this group.
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simulation results show a small, consistent decrease in all poverty measures. The key point
from the simulation results is that the decline in relative poverty is the result of a strong
policy e¤ect counteracting market forces. In particular, the headcount ratio decreased by
12:2% while it would have increased by 11:3% in the absence of actual policy changes. The
strongest upward pressure on poverty from changes in market incomes a¤ects the over
sixties (42:1% increase in the absence of policy).21 The total e¤ect,  18:1%, nonetheless
reects the impact of policy choices beneting the elderly.22 The poverty reducing e¤ect
for families with children is likely to be due to broadly stable welfare payments and the
increased targeting of family transfers, as described above, i.e. the compensation of cuts
to the universal Child Benet by increased payments to welfare recipients.
Figure 5: Decomposing Inequality/Poverty Change (Ireland, 2008-2010)
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Measures based on the simulated distribution of disposable income using SWITCH with 2008 and 2010 EU-SILC data; these indices are expressed relatively to initial period
values, normalized to 100.
4.4 UK
The Gini measure fell from 32:8 to 31:5 in the UK during the period under analysis
( 4:2%) and the Atkinson index also registered a decrease ( 17:8%). The decline in
21Between 2008 and 2010, a slightly higher proportion of the over sixties dene themselves as being
retired or unemployed, while a lower proportion report themsleves as being employed or self employed,
thus impacting upon the proportion of the over sixties in receipt of employee or self employed income.
22Benet recipients over 65 were the only group to receive an increase in social welfare payment rates
in 2009 and not see them decline in later budgets. Moreover, the Income Levy introduced in 2009 also
had a higher exemption limit for the over 65s.
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inequality seems to occur mainly in the rst half of the distribution, with a decrease
of the p50/p10 percentile ratio. These changes are driven mainly by tax-benet policy
reforms of the period. Results are in the same line regarding poverty. Relative poverty
has slightly decreased (the headcount ratio decreases by 1:9%), driven by tax-benet
policy changes such as the uprating policies for benets and the working tax credit or the
lower standard tax rate. These reforms have more than compensated for the tendency of
market income changes to increase poverty. This is also reected in the pronounced drop
in absolute poverty ( 10:9%). Admittedly, the intensity of relative poverty has slightly
increased, driven by market forces, but the depth of absolute poverty has been reduced
thanks to tax-benet policy changes. Child poverty rates saw a sharp decline from 20%
to 18:6% in 2010 due to policies, most likely due to increases in child benet rates (+8%
between 2008 and 2010) and increases in child tax credits, as documented previously.
Once again, market income changes actually pushed child poverty rates in the opposite
direction but the net overall change was negative. Elderly poverty rates also saw a fall
of 1:6 percentage points, mainly due to changes in market income although tax-benet
policy also had a role to play.
Figure 6: Decomposing Inequality/Poverty Change (UK, 2008-2010)
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Figure 7: Decomposing Inequality/Poverty Change: International Comparison
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5 Concluding Discussion
This paper examined the impact on inequality and poverty of the rst three years of the
Great Recession in France, Germany, Ireland and the UK. Using microsimulated counter-
factuals, we decompose changes in inequality and poverty measures into the contribution
of tax-benet policy changes and all other factors, notably those impacting on gross in-
come distributions because of the crisis (job losses, work sharing, wage cuts, etc.) or
because of other, non-simulated policies (e.g. minimum wage changes etc.). To put re-
sults in perspective, Figure 7 compares policy and other e¤ects for all countries, unveiling
very contrasted trends. Maybe counter to intuition, the country most a¤ected by the eco-
nomic turmoil, Ireland, implemented a strong and very progressive set of policy responses
over this period. To a large extent, this policy response served to o¤set the rise in in-
equality and relative poverty which would have arisen from changes in unemployment and
market income. While policy e¤ects are comparable in France and the UK, they did not
prevent a rise in the relative poverty count and intensity due to market forces in France,
while they managed to stabilize or even reduce them in the UK. Another unexpected
result is the relatively regressive policy response in Germany. While the period under
investigation is too short to draw conclusions regarding a change in the German social
model, the years 2008-2010 have, nonetheless, witnessed a combination of regressive tax
policy and slow uprating of social benets for the poorest and these are responsible for
increased poverty in this country. Overall, a general conclusion from our analysis is that
tax-benet policy e¤ects have had a very important role, sometimes larger than the shock
on market incomes due to the crisis. For instance, policy e¤ects explain almost all of the
relative poverty increase in Germany and of the decline in relative poverty in Ireland and
the UK. As stressed in the introduction, our analysis unfortunately stops in 2010 due to
the unavailability of combined microsimulation and data for more recent years in such a
comparative framework as the one we use. It is, nonetheless, important to characterize
the policy responses that have followed the onset of the economic slump while our study
has performed this for the rst dip in the recent recession.
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A Appendix
A.1 Description of Tax-Benet Policies
Table A.1: Description of Microsimulated Tax-Benet Policies
France Germany Ireland
Taxation and Social Security Contributions
Income tax Income tax Income tax
Tax credit (PPE) Tax allowances Family Income Supplement
Solidarity Contribution (CSG, CRDS) Solidarity Surplus Tax Income Levy
Employees' social security contributions Employees' social security contributions Employees' social security contributions
Employers' social security contributions Employers' social security contributions
Family Benefits
Universal child benefit Universal child benefit Universal child benefit
Back to school benefit Child Raising Allowance (a) Maternity benefit
Additional means-tested child benefits Benefit for Non-Earning Mothers (b) Home Carer Tax Credit
Social Benefits
Housing benefits Housing support (c) Rent/Mortgage Supplement
Widow benefit Social assistance (d) Survivor's & Widow's Benefits
Minimum pension Social assistance (d) Pre-Retirement & old age Benefits
Disability benefit Social assistance (d) Disabled, Invalidity & Injury Benefits
Social assistance (RMI or RSA) Social assistance (d) Long Term Unemployed Benefits
Social Minimum
Social assistance for lone parents (API) Social assistance (d) Lone Parent Benefits
(a) "Bundeserziehungsgeld" and "Landeserziehungsgeld"
(b) "Entbindungsgeld"
(c) "Wohngeld"
(d) Sozialhilfe
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Table A.2: Description of Tax-Benet Policy Changes over 2008-2010
France Germany Ireland UK
Structural reforms: Taxes and Contributions
Tax on capital income
 Withholding tax on capital
increased by 2 points in 2009;
1.1% tax on capital to finance
RSA in 2010
In 2009, introduction of
withholding tax on capital income
of 25%; tax allowance increased
Progressive income tax
Two-thirds relief of the tax bill
for lowest earners in 2009; top
marginal tax rate increased by 1
point in 2010
Lowest income tax rate decreased
by 1 point in 2010
Income Levy of 2 to 6% on all gross
incomes, by end of 2009
50% top tax rate introduced in 2010
Social security contributions
Health Levy doubled (to 4%, and
5% on high incomes) over the period
Standard rate reduced from 17.5% to
15% in 2009
Structural reforms: Benefits
Social (and unemployment) assistance
Extension of social assistance
to the working poor (RSA) in
2009
In 2010, Jobseekers Allowance
reduced for those aged 18-21
Child benefits, tax credits & social
transfer child increments
Reforms of universal child benefit,
education benefit and child
allowances in 2009
Over the period, decrease in child
benefit (see below) compensated for
poor families by an increase of 24%
in social benefit child increments
Child increment of the Child Tax
Credit increased by 7.2% over the
period
Uprating policies: % change in tax-benefit monetary parameters between 2008-2010
Social Assistance payments 2.7% 1.2% -0.9% 8.2%
Child benefit payments £ 3.0% 6.5% -9.6% 8.0%
SSC thresholds † 6.2% 2.9% 0.0% 7.2%
Income tax thresholds † 1.9% 3.0% 2.6% 6.3%
In-work transfer ‡ 0.0% n/a 2.0%* 6.7%
For comparison: % change in mean wage and income
Minimum wage 2.7% n/a 0.0% 5.1%
Mean wage 1.8% 2.3% -3.9% 1.7%
Uprating factor α * -1.4% -0.4% -11.1% 1.0%
£ the Child Tax Credit in the UK has been frozen nominally
* Factor α is the distributionally-neutral uprating factor used in the "no reform" scenarios; it is calculated as the % change in mean income over the period and necessarily smaller than wage progression in time of
job losses and work sharing.
† Social security contribution (SSC) and Income tax thresholds averaged over all thresholds. In Ireland, no change to the SSC ceiling but an increase of 48% in the maximum amount payable.
‡ In-work benefit or tax credit on labor income. In Ireland, Family Income Supplement received is 60% of the gap between family income and an income limit. This income limit increased by 3.3%, hence a 2%
increase i.e. 60%*3.3%
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A.2 Detailed Decomposition Results
Table A.3: Decomposition of Inequality/Poverty Changes (France, 2008-2010)
data year: 0 0 1 0 1
uprated to: 1 1
policy year: 0 0 0 1 1
uprated to: 1 1
Mean of Mean of
(4)-(2), (3)-(1) (2)-(1), (4)-(3)
Inequality
Gini 26.5 26.5 27.8 26.1 28.4 1.9 0.0 0.5 1.4 -0.4 2.3 0.1 1.8
Atkinson 0.5 6.1 6.1 6.8 5.9 7.0 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.7 -0.2 1.1 0.0 0.9
P90/P10 3.04 3.04 3.12 2.98 3.16 0.12 0.00 0.04 0.08 -0.05 0.17 -0.01 0.13
P90/P50 1.81 1.81 1.82 1.80 1.84 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.00 0.03
P50/P10 1.68 1.68 1.71 1.66 1.72 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.04
Total poverty (60% median income)
FGT0 (%) 10.3 10.3 11.8 9.8 11.7 1.4 0.0 -0.1 1.5 -0.6 2.0 -0.3 1.7
FGT1 (%) 2.3 2.3 2.9 2.2 2.9 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.6 -0.1 0.7 -0.1 0.6
FGT2 (%) 1.0 1.0 1.3 0.9 1.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3
Total poverty (50% median income)
FGT0 (%) 4.9 5.0 6.2 4.8 6.4 1.5 0.0 0.2 1.3 -0.2 1.7 0.0 1.5
FGT1 (%) 1.3 1.3 1.7 1.2 1.7 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.4 -0.1 0.4 0.0 0.4
FGT2 (%) 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2
Total poverty (poverty line fixed at 60% median)
FGT0 (%) 10.3 10.3 9.9 9.5 9.3 -1.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.5 -0.9 -0.1 -0.7 -0.3
FGT1 (%) 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.2 2.3 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.2
FGT2 (%) 1.0 1.0 1.1 0.9 1.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.1
Child poverty
FGT0 (%) 10.5 10.5 11.6 9.9 11.0 0.5 0.0 -0.6 1.1 -0.5 1.0 -0.6 1.1
FGT1 (%) 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
FGT2 (%) 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.7 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1
Child poverty (poverty line fixed)
FGT0 (%) 10.5 10.5 9.1 9.6 8.4 -2.0 0.0 -0.6 -1.4 -0.9 -1.1 -0.8 -1.3
FGT1 (%) 2.1 2.1 1.6 1.9 1.6 -0.5 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.1 -0.4 0.0 -0.4
FGT2 (%) 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.5 -0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.3
Poverty age>60
FGT0 (%) 10.5 10.5 9.9 9.4 10.4 -0.1 0.0 0.5 -0.6 -1.1 1.1 -0.3 0.2
FGT1 (%) 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.5 1.9 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.4 -0.2 0.3
FGT2 (%) 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.2
Poverty age>60 (poverty line fixed)
FGT0 (%) 10.5 10.5 8.2 8.8 7.5 -3.0 0.0 -0.7 -2.3 -1.7 -1.3 -1.2 -1.8
FGT1 (%) 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.3 -0.4 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1
FGT2 (%) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0
Other poor
FGT0 (%) 10.4 10.4 13.3 10.1 13.1 2.7 0.0 -0.2 2.9 -0.3 3.0 -0.2 3.0
FGT1 (%) 2.9 2.9 4.1 2.8 4.0 1.1 0.0 -0.1 1.2 -0.1 1.2 -0.1 1.2
FGT2 (%) 1.4 1.4 2.1 1.3 2.0 0.6 0.0 -0.1 0.7 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.7
Contribution of child poverty to total poverty (%)
FGT0 (%) 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FGT1 (%) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1
FGT2 (%) 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1
Contribution of old age poverty to total poverty (%)
FGT0 (%) 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FGT1 (%) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FGT2 (%) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Measures are based on equivalized income using the modified OECD scale. The poverty line is 60% of the median equivalized income. Gini, Atkinson index and FGT
poverty measures are multiplied by 100. Period 0 is 2008 (using 2008 data based on 2007 income) and period 1 is 2010 (using 2010 data based on 2009 income).
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Table A.4: Decomposition of Inequality/Poverty Changes (Germany, 2008-2010)
data year: 0 0 1 0 1
uprated to: 1 1
policy year: 0 0 0 1 1
uprated to: 1 1
Mean of Mean of
(4)-(2), (3)-(1) (2)-(1), (4)-(3)
Inequality
Gini 27.5 27.5 27.0 27.5 27.1 -0.5 0.0 0.0 -0.5 0.0 -0.4 0.0 -0.5
Atkinson 0.5 6.7 6.7 6.6 6.7 6.6 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1
P90/P10 3.29 3.29 3.26 3.31 3.28 -0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.03
P90/P50 1.80 1.80 1.79 1.79 1.79 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
P50/P10 1.83 1.83 1.82 1.84 1.84 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.01
Total poverty (60% median income)
FGT0 (%) 16.1 16.1 16.4 16.9 17.2 1.1 0.0 0.8 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.3
FGT1 (%) 4.6 4.6 4.8 4.9 5.1 0.6 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
FGT2 (%) 2.3 2.3 2.6 2.5 2.8 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3
Total poverty (50% median income)
FGT0 (%) 9.6 9.6 9.9 10.3 10.4 0.9 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.1 0.6 0.2
FGT1 (%) 2.9 2.9 3.2 3.1 3.4 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3
FGT2 (%) 1.7 1.7 2.0 1.8 2.1 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3
Total poverty (poverty line fixed at 60% median)
FGT0 (%) 16.1 16.1 16.0 15.4 15.1 -1.1 0.0 -0.9 -0.1 -0.7 -0.4 -0.8 -0.3
FGT1 (%) 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.5 4.6 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.2
FGT2 (%) 2.3 2.3 2.6 2.3 2.6 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3
Child poverty
FGT0 (%) 14.3 14.3 16.0 13.8 14.9 0.6 0.0 -1.1 1.7 -0.5 1.1 -0.8 1.4
FGT1 (%) 4.0 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.8 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1
FGT2 (%) 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.9 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Child poverty (poverty line fixed)
FGT0 (%) 14.3 14.3 15.3 12.2 12.1 -2.2 0.0 -3.1 1.0 -2.1 0.0 -2.6 0.5
FGT1 (%) 4.0 4.0 3.8 3.6 3.3 -0.7 0.0 -0.5 -0.2 -0.5 -0.2 -0.5 -0.2
FGT2 (%) 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.9 1.7 -0.4 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
Poverty age>60
FGT0 (%) 15.3 15.3 14.1 16.7 15.9 0.7 0.0 1.8 -1.2 1.4 -0.8 1.6 -1.0
FGT1 (%) 3.6 3.6 3.5 4.0 3.9 0.3 0.0 0.4 -0.1 0.4 -0.1 0.4 -0.1
FGT2 (%) 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0
Poverty age>60 (poverty line fixed)
FGT0 (%) 15.3 15.3 13.9 15.3 13.9 -1.4 0.0 -0.1 -1.3 0.0 -1.4 0.0 -1.4
FGT1 (%) 3.6 3.6 3.4 3.6 3.4 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.2
FGT2 (%) 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other poor
FGT0 (%) 17.4 17.4 18.1 18.3 18.9 1.5 0.0 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.6
FGT1 (%) 5.4 5.4 6.0 5.8 6.4 1.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6
FGT2 (%) 2.9 2.9 3.6 3.1 3.8 0.8 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.6
Contribution of child poverty to total poverty (%)
FGT0 (%) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FGT1 (%) 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FGT2 (%) 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Contribution of old age poverty to total poverty (%)
FGT0 (%) 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FGT1 (%) 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FGT2 (%) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(0) (1) (2) (4)-(3)(4)-(2)
Total
change
Homog-
eneity
check
(4)-(0) (1)-(0)
Shorrocks-Shapley
Decomposition
Policy effect Other effects
Measures are based on equivalized income using the modified OECD scale. The poverty line is 60% of the median equivalized income. Gini, Atkinson index and FGT
poverty measures are multiplied by 100. Period 0 is 2008 (using 2008 data based on 2007 income) and period 1 is 2010 (using 2010 data based on 2009 income).
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Table A.5: Decomposition of Inequality/Poverty Changes (Ireland, 2008-2010)
data year: 0 0 1 0 1
uprated to: 1 1
policy year: 0 0 0 1 1
uprated to: 1 1
Mean of Mean of
(4)-(2), (3)-(1) (2)-(1), (4)-(3)
Inequality
Gini 29.1 29.1 32.0 26.2 29.2 0.2 0.0 -2.8 3.0 -2.8 3.0 -2.8 3.0
Atkinson 0.5 7.1 7.1 8.6 5.9 7.3 0.2 0.0 -1.3 1.5 -1.2 1.4 -1.2 1.4
P90/P10 3.6 3.6 4.2 3.1 3.6 0.0 0.0 -0.6 0.6 -0.5 0.5 -0.5 0.6
P90/P50 1.9 1.9 2.1 1.8 2.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.3 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.2
P50/P10 1.9 1.9 2.0 1.7 1.8 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.1
Total poverty (60% median income)
FGT0 (%) 15.7 15.6 17.6 12.3 13.8 -1.8 -0.1 -3.9 2.0 -3.3 1.5 -3.6 1.8
FGT1 (%) 3.8 3.7 3.8 2.9 3.1 -0.6 0.0 -0.7 0.1 -0.8 0.2 -0.8 0.1
FGT2 (%) 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.7 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.3 0.1 -0.2 0.0
Total poverty (50% median income)
FGT0 (%) 7.7 7.6 7.4 5.7 5.7 -1.9 -0.1 -1.7 -0.2 -1.9 0.1 -1.8 -0.1
FGT1 (%) 2.2 2.2 2.1 1.8 1.9 -0.3 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 0.1 -0.3 0.0
FGT2 (%) 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.0
Total poverty (poverty line fixed at 60% median)
FGT0 (%) 15.7 15.5 16.2 10.8 11.5 -4.0 -0.1 -4.7 0.6 -4.8 0.7 -4.7 0.7
FGT1 (%) 3.8 3.7 3.5 2.6 2.7 -1.0 -0.1 -0.9 -0.1 -1.0 0.0 -1.0 -0.1
FGT2 (%) 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.6 -0.3 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 0.1 -0.3 0.0
Child poverty
FGT0 (%) 15.4 15.3 16.1 12.1 13.5 -1.8 -0.1 -2.6 0.8 -3.2 1.4 -2.9 1.1
FGT1 (%) 3.0 2.9 3.0 2.4 2.5 -0.4 0.0 -0.5 0.1 -0.6 0.2 -0.5 0.1
FGT2 (%) 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0
Child poverty (fixed poverty line)
FGT0 (%) 15.4 15.2 15.6 10.0 11.4 -3.8 -0.2 -4.2 0.4 -5.2 1.4 -4.7 0.9
FGT1 (%) 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.1 2.1 -0.8 -0.1 -0.7 -0.1 -0.8 0.0 -0.7 -0.1
FGT2 (%) 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0
Poverty age>60
FGT0 (%) 10.6 10.6 17.7 6.9 8.7 -1.9 -0.1 -9.0 7.1 -3.7 1.8 -6.3 4.5
FGT1 (%) 1.9 1.9 2.7 1.3 1.9 0.1 0.0 -0.8 0.8 -0.6 0.6 -0.7 0.7
FGT2 (%) 0.7 0.7 1.2 0.6 1.0 0.3 0.0 -0.2 0.5 -0.2 0.5 -0.2 0.5
Poverty age>60 (fixed poverty line)
FGT0 (%) 10.6 10.5 11.9 5.7 6.4 -4.1 -0.1 -5.5 1.4 -4.8 0.7 -5.2 1.1
FGT1 (%) 1.9 1.8 2.4 1.2 1.6 -0.2 0.0 -0.8 0.5 -0.7 0.4 -0.7 0.5
FGT2 (%) 0.7 0.7 1.1 0.5 1.0 0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.4 -0.2 0.4 -0.2 0.4
Other poor
FGT0 (%) 20.2 20.1 19.2 17.2 19.1 -1.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.9 -3.0 1.9 -1.6 0.5
FGT1 (%) 6.1 6.1 5.7 4.8 4.9 -1.2 0.0 -0.8 -0.4 -1.2 0.0 -1.0 -0.2
FGT2 (%) 3.4 3.4 3.1 2.8 2.8 -0.6 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 -0.6 0.0 -0.4 -0.2
Contribution of child poverty to total poverty (%)
FGT0 (%) 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FGT1 (%) 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FGT2 (%) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Contribution of old age poverty to total poverty (%)
FGT0 (%) 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.1
FGT1 (%) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
FGT2 (%) 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
(3)-(1) (4)-(3)
Measures are based on equivalized income using the modified OECD scale. The poverty line is 60% of the median equivalized income. Gini, Atkinson index and FGT
poverty measures are multiplied by 100. Period 0 is 2008 (using data with 2008 income) and period 1 is 2010 (using data with 2010 income).
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Table A.6: Decomposition of Inequality/Poverty Changes (UK, 2008-2010)
data year: 0 0 1 0 1
uprated to: 1 1
policy year: 0 0 0 1 1
uprated to: 1 1
Mean of Mean of
(4)-(2), (3)-(1) (2)-(1), (4)-(3)
Inequality
Gini 32.8 32.8 32.4 31.8 31.5 -1.4 0.0 -0.9 -0.5 -1.1 -0.3 -1.0 -0.4
Atkinson 0.5 10.4 10.4 9.1 9.6 8.6 -1.9 0.0 -0.6 -1.3 -0.8 -1.0 -0.7 -1.2
P90/P10 3.95 3.95 4.04 3.80 3.91 -0.04 0.00 -0.13 0.09 -0.15 0.11 -0.14 0.10
P90/P50 1.98 1.98 2.00 1.97 1.98 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.02
P50/P10 1.99 1.99 2.02 1.93 1.98 -0.02 0.00 -0.05 0.03 -0.06 0.04 -0.05 0.04
Total poverty (60% median income)
FGT0 (%) 17.6 17.6 18.2 16.6 17.3 -0.3 0.0 -1.0 0.6 -1.0 0.7 -1.0 0.7
FGT1 (%) 4.9 4.9 5.3 4.5 5.0 0.1 0.0 -0.3 0.4 -0.3 0.5 -0.3 0.4
FGT2 (%) 2.4 2.4 2.7 2.2 2.5 0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.3 -0.2 0.3 -0.2 0.3
Total poverty (50% median income)
FGT0 (%) 10.3 10.3 11.0 8.9 10.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.8 0.7 -1.4 1.2 -1.1 1.0
FGT1 (%) 3.1 3.1 3.4 2.9 3.2 0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.4 -0.2 0.4 -0.2 0.4
FGT2 (%) 1.7 1.7 2.0 1.6 1.9 0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.3 -0.1 0.3 -0.1 0.3
Total poverty (poverty line fixed at 60% median)
FGT0 (%) 17.6 17.6 17.4 15.8 15.7 -1.9 0.0 -1.7 -0.2 -1.8 -0.1 -1.7 -0.2
FGT1 (%) 4.9 4.9 5.1 4.3 4.6 -0.3 0.0 -0.5 0.2 -0.5 0.2 -0.5 0.2
FGT2 (%) 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.1 2.4 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.2
Child poverty
FGT0 (%) 20.0 20.0 21.0 17.7 18.6 -1.3 0.0 -2.4 1.1 -2.2 0.9 -2.3 1.0
FGT1 (%) 5.4 5.4 5.6 5.0 5.0 -0.4 0.0 -0.5 0.1 -0.4 0.0 -0.5 0.1
FGT2 (%) 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.4 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0
Child poverty (fixed poverty line)
FGT0 (%) 20.0 20.0 19.8 16.8 16.4 -3.6 0.0 -3.5 -0.1 -3.2 -0.4 -3.3 -0.3
FGT1 (%) 5.4 5.4 5.3 4.8 4.6 -0.8 0.0 -0.7 -0.2 -0.6 -0.2 -0.6 -0.2
FGT2 (%) 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3 -0.4 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1
Poverty age>60
FGT0 (%) 18.2 18.2 16.7 17.7 16.6 -1.6 0.0 -0.1 -1.5 -0.5 -1.1 -0.3 -1.3
FGT1 (%) 3.7 3.7 3.4 3.5 3.3 -0.4 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
FGT2 (%) 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.1 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Poverty age>60 (fixed poverty line)
FGT0 (%) 18.2 18.2 15.7 16.8 14.7 -3.5 0.0 -1.0 -2.6 -1.5 -2.1 -1.2 -2.3
FGT1 (%) 3.7 3.7 3.1 3.2 2.8 -0.8 0.0 -0.3 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5
FGT2 (%) 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2
Other poor
FGT0 (%) 16.0 16.0 17.6 15.3 17.0 1.0 0.0 -0.6 1.6 -0.7 1.7 -0.7 1.7
FGT1 (%) 5.3 5.3 6.3 4.9 6.0 0.7 0.0 -0.3 1.0 -0.4 1.1 -0.3 1.1
FGT2 (%) 2.9 2.9 3.7 2.6 3.5 0.6 0.0 -0.2 0.8 -0.2 0.8 -0.2 0.8
Contribution of child poverty to total poverty (%)
FGT0 (%) 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FGT1 (%) 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FGT2 (%) 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Contribution of old age poverty to total poverty (%)
FGT0 (%) 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FGT1 (%) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FGT2 (%) 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Measures are based on equivalized income using the modified OECD scale. The poverty line is 60% of the median equivalized income. Gini, Atkinson index and FGT
poverty measures are multiplied by 100. Period 0 is 2008 (using data with 2008/9 income) and period 1 is 2010 (using data with 2009/10 income).
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A.3 Comparison of Simulated versus Observed Disposable In-
come
As explained in the text, our decomposition exercise is based on simulated rather than
observed data on disposable income. Simulations are precisely the added value of this
exercise since they allow us to produce counterfactual distributions to be used in the
decomposition to isolate tax-benet policy e¤ects from other e¤ects. The drawback, how-
ever, is that simulated income distributions for actual situations (those of years 2008 and
2010) do not always perfectly match external information. We explain why in what fol-
lows. Nonetheless, the important aspect is that while inequality and poverty measures
may di¤er in levels at any point in time, time variations point in the same direction
for both simulated and external data, as can be seen in Figure A.1. In this graph, we
compare our simulated trends with o¢ cial statistics (Eurostat for France and Germany,
Households Below Average Income (HBAI) data for the UK and statistics from the CSO
for Ireland). The values used to produce these trends are detailed in Table A.7. As men-
tioned above, we observe important discrepancies in levels in this table, which can be
explained by at least three groups of factors. First, these di¤erences may just reveal the
imperfect comparison between simulated and external data to the extent that the deni-
tion of disposable income, or the way it is calculated, di¤ers in the two sources we give
more detailed explanations country by country below. Second, discrepancies can be at-
tributed to data issues concerning disposable income for some countries where interviews
are used and, possibly, contaminated with measurement errors and recall errors (when
people are asked how much taxes were paid or benet received in a particular year). This
is not a systematic source of errors: for France, for instance, income information in EU-
SILC data is drawn from the Administrative Tax Revenue Data and is, therefore, very
accurate. Third, and more likely, di¤erences can be attributed to simplication assump-
tions made in microsimulation, including (i) the assumption of full take-up of benets
or tax credits (although we do introduce basic take-up modeling for certain benets, as
discussed hereafter), (ii) the assumption of tax compliance (we do not assume any rate of
non-compliance, fraud, error or tax evasion); (iii) the amount of tax modeled by higher
earners is often larger than the amount of tax actually paid (as they may avail of certain
smaller tax relief schemes that are not possible to model in a microsimulation framework);
(iv) timing issues such as the fact that reforms take place during the year (in addition,
income data for France and Germany are provided with a delay, as discussed in section
3.1 and below). We now provide more detailed explanations country by country (see also
Doorley, 2013, Ochmann and Fossen, 2012, Keane et al., 2013, and Sutherland, 2013 for
a thorough account of simulation assumptions for France, Germany, Ireland and the UK
respectively).
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France. EUROMOD-simulated inequality and poverty rates are underestimated in France,
as can be seen in Table A.7. To understand the discrepancies, it is important to bear in
mind that no data adjustments are made in EUROMOD in situations where the policy
year does not correspond to the data year except a nominal adjustment of the di¤erent
types of income since they are recorded for year t   1 in data of year t, as explained in
section 3.1. In particular, no adjustment is made for changes in market income distribu-
tion that have taken place between t  1 and t. For instance, it is possible that losses in
employment may be driving the higher inequality observed in external statistics, but not
showing up in EUROMOD. Non-take-up of some means-tested benets or administrative
errors in the implementation of these benets may play a role in poverty discrepancies.
Only the non take-up of general social assistance (RMI/ RSA) is simulated in EURO-
MOD and done by simple random draws of non-claiming households. If marginalized,
peripheral groups are less likely to claim benets to which they are theoretically entitled,
incomes at the bottom will be inated in EUROMOD and poverty will be underestimated.
Child poverty is also greatly understated in EUROMOD, for the same reason but also
for additional factors. For instance, it is possible that non-take up of some means-tested
family benets also accounts for this pattern. Data limitations must also play a role in
the observed discrepancies. For instance, accurate simulation of the parental leave benet
was not possible given the information available in SILC, resulting in a substantial overes-
timation of this benet compared to external statistics (see Doorley, 2013). Importantly,
these limitations are systematic across years so that they should a¤ect trends less than
levels. Indeed, Figure A.1 conrms that inequality trends according to our simulation are
comparable to external benchmarks. We nd a larger increase in poverty risk calculated
using the poverty line at 60% of the median (+1:4 percentage points versus +0:2 in ex-
ternal statistics). With a poverty line at 50% of the median (not reported), results are
more comparable (+1:5 points versus +0:8 in external statistics).
Germany. Table A.7 shows that inequality is underestimated in EUROMOD simu-
lations for Germany while poverty is slightly overestimated. Child poverty is largely
comparable to external benchmarks. As in the case of France, policy simulations for a
year t in Germany rely on income information from year t   1. As a result, changes in
work duration or wage inequalities between 2007 and 2008 or 2009 and 2010 may explain
the higher inequality observed in the external benchmarks for our base and end years.
Moreover, to render the 2008 and 2010 German data comparable, it was necessary to
discard the imputation of tax allowances which was introduced only in 2010. This results
in an over-estimation of tax liabilities (of around 10% on average).23 As with the French
23Nonetheless, a robustness check which re-introduces the imputation of tax-allowances in 2010 does
not qualitatively change the results of any of our decompositions for Germany.
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social assistance scheme, we also model take-up of social assistance in Germany. Unem-
ployment assistance, old-age assistance and general social assistance are assumed to have
take-up rates of 59%, following the available literature on benet take-up in Germany
(Bruckmeier and Wiemers, 2011). It should also be noted that housing benets have
not been simulated in EUROMOD, but simply imputed from the data, because reported
information on housing expenditures is not detailed enough. These factors are likely to
contribute to the overestimation of poverty observed in our results. These limitations are
consistent across years and Figure A.1 shows that simulated and actual trends in total
poverty and inequality go in the same direction.
Ireland. External statistics are provided by the Central Statistics O¢ ce (CSO) in Ire-
land but we also refer to information from Eurostat for comparability purposes. As in
Germany, simulations for Ireland underestimate inequality and overestimate poverty ac-
cording to Table A.7. Simulations acknowledge the low take-up levels of the Irish transfer
to working poor households (the Family Income Supplement, FIS), imputing a random
take-up rate of 33%. As in the French case, however, random imputation may be a crude
approximation. In addition, one driving factor for the di¤erence with external sources is
the fact that SWITCH is based on current income, while CSO results are based on annual
income. Lump sums, such as retirement and redundancy payments which are likely to
have increased in importance during the recession,24 will appear in annual income but
not current income. The issue of current compared to annual income will also inuence
where individuals are found in the income distribution given changes in their employment
status over time, especially during a period of rising unemployment. In terms of trends
(Figure A.1), external statistics show a larger rise in the Gini (+0:9 percentage points
compared to +0:1 in the simulation). Our simulations show a fall in the overall poverty
rate ( 12:2%) which is conrmed by Eurostat statistics, even if it is substantially smaller
( 1:9%).25 Poverty using 50% of the median also compares better (not reported) with
Eurostat indicating a decrease of 12% (starting from a "at risk of poverty" rate of 7:7%)
while our simulations give a 25% decline (starting from 8:1%).
UK. External gures for the UK (HBAI) are provided by the Department of Work and
Pension and based on the same underlying data source as for EUROMOD, the FRS. While
24Redundancy payments will have increased in importance as unemployment grew. In addition to this,
the Incentivised Early Retirement Schemewill have resulted in larger numbers receiving retirement
lump sum retirement payments.
25CSO external statistics show a slight rise (+0:3). Note however that our simulation and Eurostat use
the modied OECD equivalence scale (which gives a weight of 1 to the rst adult in a household, .5 to
subsequent adults and .3 to children) while the CSO uses a national equivalence scale (giving a weight of
.66 to subsequent adults and .33 to children), which reduces still the comparison possibilities.
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the simulated poverty rate is close to the external statistics, the Gini coe¢ cient for the
base year is underestimated.26 In addition to the standard di¤erences mentioned above re-
garding simulated versus actual data, Sutherland (2013) suggests a possible reason for the
discrepancy in the Gini. The external statistics (HBAI) correct for an insu¢ cient number
of high income households in the FRS data sample using administrative information from
tax statistics. As Sutherland (2013) point out, this will result in an increase in income at
the upper end of the income distribution and a¤ect the Gini measure. It is indicated that
results from EUROMOD and external statistics become closer once this issue is taken into
account. Note also that non-take-up is modeled for the Working Tax Credit, with the
same limitation as emphasized above. Despite these potential caveats, simulated trends
in inequality and poverty are relatively similar to those based on external statistics for the
UK. External statistics for the Gini show a sharper fall (3 percentage points) compared to
EUROMOD simulations (1:4 points). The pattern in overall and child poverty rates point
in the same direction and are more similar, with the EUROMOD results being slightly
lower than the external statistics.
26Recall the particular nature of the data in the case of the UK, i.e. collected between April and March
of the following year, as discussed in Section 3. For comparison, we have simply used o¢ cial statistics
averaged for each pair of years, 2008/09 and 2009/10.
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Figure A.1: Comparison of Changes in Income Distribution
2008-2010 using Simulated versus Observed Incomes
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Table A.7: Comparing Simulated and Observed Income Distribution: Levels and Trends
Δ Δ Δ% Δ%
base end base end (S) (E) (S) (E)
France
Gini 26,5 28,4 28,2 29,9 1,9 1,7 7,1% 5,9%
Poverty rate 10,3 11,7 12,9 13,1 1,4 0,2 13,4% 1,6%
Child poverty rate 10,5 11,0 15,4 17,1 0,5 1,7 4,8% 10,7%
Germany
Gini 27,5 27,1 30,3 29,2 -0,5 -1,1 -1,7% -3,6%
Poverty rate 16,1 17,2 15,2 15,6 1,1 0,4 6,6% 2,3%
Child poverty rate 14,3 14,9 14,3 15,9 0,6 1,6 4,2% 11,2%
Ireland
Gini 29,1 29,2 30,7 31,6 0,1 0,9 0,5% 2,9%
Poverty rate (a) 15,7 13,8 14,4 14,7 -1,9 0,3 -12,2% 2,1%
Poverty rate (b) 15,7 13,8 15,5 15,2 -1,9 -0,3 -12,2% -1,9%
Child poverty rate* 15,4 13,5 18,8 18,4 -1,9 -0,4 -12,3% -2,1%
UK
Gini 32,8 31,5 36,0 33,0 -1,4 -3,0 -4,2% -8,3%
Poverty rate 17,6 17,3 17,3 16,6 -0,3 -0,7 -1,9% -4,0%
Child poverty rate 20,0 18,6 21,9 20,1 -1,3 -1,8 -6,7% -8,2%
* External statistics are for those <17 for Ireland.
External (E)
External statistics taken from Eurostat for France and Germany, the Department of Work and Prensions for the UK and (a) the Central Statistics Office or (b)
EUROSTAT for Ireland. Base year external statistics are for 2008 for Ireland, average over 2007-08 for France and Germany and 2008-09 for the UK.
End year external statistics are for 2010 for Ireland, average over 2009-10 for France and Germany and 2009-10 for the UK. Poverty is calculated using
observed or simulated disposable incomes after equivalization (modified OECD scale) and using the 60% median poverty line.
Simulation (S)
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